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When Boris Yeltsin named Vladimir Putin Acting President in December 1999, many in the western capitals hurriedly attempted to determine who he was and how he rose in three years from being an obscure municipal official to Acting President of Russia. In his earlier career, Putin served 16 years in the KGB, the Soviet Secret Police, as a Lt. Colonel assigned to East Germany. After retiring from the KGB, he went to work in St. Petersburg city government in several posts, including Deputy Mayor. The Yeltsin government then brought him to Moscow where he held several positions before being appointed as the director of the Federal Security Service, the new Russian name for the domestic KGB. He then became Prime Minister and Acting President, and then was elected in his own right in March 26, 2000 . Some believe Putin's meteoric rise was a function of his reputation for absolute loyalty to his superiors above all other considerations and his ruthlessness in executing orders. In the most comprehensive research into corruption in the Russian government to date, Dr. Karen Dawisha argues in her book, Putin's Kleptocracy, that a small group of former KBG agents from St. Petersburg hatched a plan to take over the Russian economy and political system, a plan they had effectively accomplished by the mid-2000's. She argues that Putin pursued successively higher offices in part to protect himself from an ongoing investigation of his corruption while serving in St. Petersburg city government.
Much of the initial Western perception of Vladimir Putin was based on his early years as President, when he was thought to be an economic reformer who sought to bring Russia into the liberal international economic order. For the first six years of Putin's Presidency, Russia was treated as a great power and was one of the select countries included in G-8 meetings. Beginning in the mid-2000's, Putin abandoned his economic reform agenda and shifted the direction of his government, ending Russia's integration into the world economy, crushing civil society, gaining virtual control of the Russian electronic news media, and seizing the territory of neighboring states such as Georgia and Ukraine, while aggressively rearming. Russia began its withdrawal from global economic integration well before the invasion of Ukraine, for reasons which remain debated among Russia observers. After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was expelled from the G-8 and has been isolated in international bodies. Perhaps the most glaring evidence of this isolation is the vote on resolution 68/262 in the U.N. General Assembly on March 27, 2014. Resolution 68/262 condemned Russian aggression in annexing Crimea, which had been part of Ukraine: 100 nations voted yes, 11 voted no, and 58 nations abstained.
European and U.S. policymakers were slow to acknowledge and react to the reality of Putin's Russia, its revisionist policies, and the threat it posed to western democracies and its other neighbors. 1 European paralysis in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine was in part a result of multiple, simultaneous other crises distracting it from Putin's military adventures. Since the end of the Cold War, many European countries had virtually unilaterally disarmed by neglecting its military. The financial crisis in Southern Europe caused serious strains among European Union member states, particularly Greece versus Germany over the Greek bailout. Other European countries which have not faced actual financial crisis, have experienced sustained economic stagnation with no new jobs for students as they graduate, no rising standards of living, and no growth in tax revenues to support public services. Repeated radical Islamist terrorist incidents made European publics feel more and more insecure, and the inability of democratically-elected government to address the threat caused voters to move to the political extremes to choose their leaders. Then there was the forced migration crisis which brought more than two million refugees and economic migrants to Europe in two years and with them, cultural clashes between the new arrivals and the local population.
At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 9, 2015, Major General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked to identify the greatest global threat to the United States. He provided a one-word answer: Russia. At the time his observation surprised many in Washington whose focus had been on the radical Islamist State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or on China. Dunford's warning about the Russian threat came three months before Vladimir Putin announced Russia would intervene in Syria to protect the Assad regime, which also apparently surprised the White House and the U.S. national security apparatus. They were again surprised when Russia bombed Assad's opponents (which the U.S. had been training and arming). Later, the Russian air force virtually destroyed the rebel stronghold, Aleppo, rather than focus on defeating ISIS, which Putin had initially used as the excuse for Russian intervention. Russia has had a history of surprising naïve outsiders who do not understand why the country and its leaders act as they do on the world stage or how the country functions internally.
Putin's Russia as an OutlieR natiOn
As the articles in this journal demonstrate, Putin's Russia is an outlier nation in that it does not fit into the existing categories of other countries which make up the world order. Many of its unique characteristics are weaknesses, not strengths. Russia is not an advanced democratic capitalist state, nor does it have much in common with Brazil, India or China, with which it is often grouped as one of the so-called BRIC countries. These countries have growing industrial and technologicallybased economies, and two are evolving democracies. China remains an autocracy, but the Chinese Communist Party does have an organized structure through which it governs. Putin rules without any functioning party system, Politburo, or Central Committee, and is certainly the most powerful Russian leader since Joseph Stalin, though he does not exercise anywhere near the same level of control over Russian society as Stalin did. Brazil, India, and China are all experiencing aggressive and very public anti-corruption campaigns. The Russian government represents the embodiment of systemic corruption on a kleptocratic scale, and faces no accountability, no investigations, and no genuine efforts at reform. If Putin loses power and a reform-minded government succeeds him, he, his circle of KGB agents and the Oligarchs who run the country, could end up in jail or worse for looting the Russian economy. An article in the January/February 2018 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, Julia Ioffe reports that Putin, obsessed with the violent demise of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, watched over and over again a video of his brutal lynching by his own people. It is the Russian people who Putin most fears, and thus ensuring his own survival may be driving his aggressive external behavior which has played on the Russian people's nationalist impulses to boost his popularity, which remains at very high levels in the opinion polls.
undeRstanding Putin's FOReign POlicy
John Mearsheimer, the international relations scholar, argues Russia's aggressiveness towards its neighbors stems from western efforts to extend NATO membership to former members of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. According to this view, traditional national interest drives Russia's behavior, and NATO extension has been seen by Putin as a threat to Russia's vital national security interests. As a result, he is responding to that perceived threat through territorial aggrandizement, aggressive ultra-nationalist ideology, and confrontation with the West. From this perspective, the western democracies helped create Vladimir Putin's Russia by impinging on its "sphere of influence" along its borders; thus, Russia is not what international relations scholars call a "revisionist power"-one which seeks to overthrow the existing international order-but a traditional state protecting what it sees as its equities and vital national interests. Other analysts, such as Anne Applebaum, argue Putin's policies are not part of a grand strategy, but are evidence of an improvised foreign policy. Thus, Russia's aggression in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and its threats to the Baltic States, may be seen not as a carefully designed and executed strategy of conquest, but as symptomatic of Putin's ad hoc, opportunistic foreign policy. He probes for Western weakness, irresolution, and indecision, and then, if there is no resistance, he intervenes to extend Russia's reach by absorbing more territory.
The limitation of these views is that they ignore what we know of the mindset in the Kremlin, the worldwide reach of Russian cyberwarfare and black operations, and the grievances which Putin himself has expressed multiple times against the Western democracies. These grievances are rooted, among other factors, in his personal experience in East Germany. Putin has sought to return Russia to great power status by weakening other competing powers or annexing neighboring states rather than risking reforms that could be destabilizing in the short term, but would strengthen Russia as a nation state over the long term. The immediate objectives of Russian foreign policy are not mysterious if one examines Putin's government's public rhetoric, its published documents, and its actions. One of Putin's greatest strengths has been the aggressive and systematic pursuit of these strategic objectives which include:
• efforts to regain military parity with the United States (they are nowhere near achieving this) • the neutralization, or at least weakening, of the NATO alliance • the end of the European Union as one of the most powerful economic blocs in the world • the creation of an alternative anti-liberal, authoritarian, reactionary governance model of statehood for which Russia is trying to gain adherents among far right and far left parties wing in Europe (not only are the far-right wing parties of Europe pro-Putin, so too is Jeremy Corbyn, the hard-left Labor leader in the U.K., and the Syriza Party elected to power in Greece in January 2015 which is dominated by Communists) • the reconstruction of the historic Russian sphere of influence through annexation of parts of neighboring states, or at least their realignment out of NATO and the European Union into Russia's orbit of influence, and the projection of Russian power to other regions of the world such as the Middle East and Af-ghanistan (CNN reported on July 25, 2017 that the Russians were arming the Taliban in Afghanistan).
Over time Putin has ruthlessly pursued these objectives with great discipline, using some of Russia's vast natural resources to rebuild the Russian military and create a powerful cyber-security capacity to pursue asymmetrical warfare against the West and vulnerable countries on the periphery. The Russian Euro-Asian land mass contains perhaps a third of earth's minerals, oil, and natural gas reserves. This represents an extraordinary treasure and source of national power, if only they had been efficiently and entirely used to increase economic productivity, build modern infrastructure, and construct a knowledge-based economy. But they weren't. Putin's ability to use these resources has been curtailed since 2014, when oil prices collapsed from $117 a barrel to $27 at the beginning of 2016 before rising in 2018 to $68. Because of this price collapse, Russia suffered a significant drop in state revenues between 2014 and 2017 due to the decline in oil prices and western economic sanctions imposed because of the invasion of Ukraine and Crimea. The ongoing demographic decline of the country, cuts in social services and pensions because of the revenue drop, and Russia's isolation from international markets by Moscow's deliberate design has constrained Putin's ambitions. Does Russia face a new threat from the Western democracies? U.S. military presence in Europe (approximately 30,000 combat troops at the end of 2016) was at its lowest level since before World War II, down from a high of 400,000 during the peak of the Cold War. Even more significant than any real or imagined threat Putin sees coming from the United States, is that the American military is going through its most painful retrenchment since the end of the Vietnam War. The U.S. defense budget by the end of the Obama Administration had been cut by nearly $150 billion. The Trump Administration's first budget does request an increase of over $50 billion in defense spending, but Trump also declared his intention to improve U.S. relations with Russia. European countries' military forces have scaled back to such a degree they have undertaken virtual unilateral disarmament. Putin's Russia's expansionary strategy with the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, its rapid increase in its defense budget, the annexation of Crimea, the rebuilding of its nuclear arsenal, and its military intervention in Syria, has all been undertaken with no self-evident threat to Russia's survival or vital national interests. Furthermore, China is Russia's only real ally in its competition with the West, at least at this writing.
If Putin's strategic objective was to minimize or reduce external threats to Russia, the invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder as it has slowly begun to mobilize the previous docile and distracted Western Alliance to counter the new threat. NATO officials have now begun publicly raising the alarm bells. Sweden and Finland which never joined NATO are now engaged in a public discussion about joining the Alliance, which has broad public support. In the last year of the Obama Administration, the U.S. redeployed an armored brigade to Europe which will rotate among Eastern European and the Baltic NATO members as a response to Russian aggression.
dOmestic PRessuRes dRiving Putin's BehaviOR
The Russian foreign policy riddle may in fact be better explained, per some essays in this issue, as a response to the power dynamics within the country rather than by any particular national security doctrine. These dynamics are internal, not external threats to Putin's rule, certainly not to Russia as a nation-state. Moscow's policies may be driven by the insecurity and illegitimacy of the small circle of Oligarchs and former KGB agents surrounding Putin who fear their own people more than they fear any outside threat, a fear which is evidence of profound, if disguised, weakness. 3 After it appeared that Putin had rigged the 2012 Presidential elections to ensure he returned to power (he would likely have won anyway), hundreds of thousands of Russians took to the streets of major cities in protest, which lasted several months. His relative restraint (protest leaders were arrested and some tortured but no massacres on the streets took place) in suppressing the popular uprising may have had more to do with his fear that the internal security forces might not carry out an order to crush the protest through brute force rather than any ethical qualms he had about a bloodbath in the streets. Or, it may have been that Putin wanted to avoid the embarrassment such a solution to the street uprising would have caused him internationally. This suggests Putin fears another public uprising, which is why he has taken control of the public's sources of information. Putin gradually emasculated the electronic major media outlets, tried to block internet access to the worldwide web, and has suppressed dissent. He has been accused by his critics of allowing or ordering the assassination of prominent journalists, civil society leaders, Oligarchs who have fallen out with Putin, and political opponents. Accounts differ on the number of journalists who have been murdered since Putin took power in 1999. They range from 12, according to a professional association of journalists, to 25, according to an article in the New Yorker. Opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was murdered on a bridge in sight of the Kremlin the day before he was to release a report with evidence that Russian troops were fighting alongside separatists in the Ukraine. Few analysts have argued that Putin himself gave orders to assassinate Nemtsov, but the five men convicted of killing him and sentenced in July 2017 in a Moscow court were Chechens with ties to Chechnya's leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, who is an acolyte of Putin's. Since the drop-in oil prices beginning in the summer of 2014, the central government has been shoring up the fragile banking system. Despite the balance sheet's visual appeal, Russia under Vladimir Putin faces a much greater risk of internal implosion than many in Western capitals understand. This is due to the cuts in public services and pensions, growing unrest among the Russian elites with Putin's policies, and the Russian military's discomfort with Putin's strategic gambling in Ukraine and earlier in Georgia. 6 To avoid this collapse, Putin has redirected the Russian people's attention to his foreign policy adventures and away from his domestic mismanagement and policy failures, but that has not changed the Russian government's balance sheet. In fact, those adventures have made that balance sheet more precarious. The Soviet Union collapsed for many reasons in 1990, but one immediate cause was its bankruptcy. During the West German-Soviet negotiations over the reunification of East and West Germany, Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union, repeatedly asked Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor, for billions of dollars in loans because of the Soviet Union's internal financial crisis (which the German government provided). 7 One of the leading energy economists, Daniel Yergin, argues that oil prices have been recalibrated to a lower price level, and thus we will not see $100 a barrel again in the foreseeable future. 8 This has created a gap between Vladimir Putin's strategic objectives and his ability to achieve them. His frustration may encourage him to take more and ever greater tactical risks which could result in unintended confrontation with NATO or the United States directly.
Anne Applebaum argues in her essay that Putin has either infiltrated, co-opted, corrupted, intimidated, or shut down most of the nascent institutions of Russian democratic pluralism that developed during the 1990's and early 2000's such as non-governmental organizations, religious institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church, think tanks, and universities. He has done this to ensure he faces no competing centers of power in Russian society, which has made him stronger personally, even as he has made Russian society weaker. This has set back Russia decades from joining other advanced countries, all of which share several critically important characteristics-a vibrant civil society (which constrains governmental abuses that would otherwise go unchecked), an independent judiciary to guarantee the rule of law, and a free press and media. Putin has now undermined all of these nascent institutions. Russia has neither rule of law nor an independent court system, and its police are corrupt and a tool of repression rather than law enforcement. Russia has evolved into what Russians call a "managed democracy," a democracy in appearance, not reality. 9 Russian institutional weakness may be found in the retarded level of internal development and the dysfunctional characteristics of its governance structure. Douglass North, the Nobel-prize winning economist, argued that what distinguishes wealthy, advanced, and stable countries from those in the developing world is the density, legitimacy, resilience, and robustness of its governmental, private sector, and civil society institutions. 10 By any measure, Russia has a weak private sector of formally incorporated businesses, a declining number of independent and increasingly fragile civil society organizations, and a massive state sector controlled by a small oligarchy in Moscow. During the Cold War, some Western analysts described the Soviet Union as a third-world country with the bomb because of its primitive health care system, poor infrastructure, lack of a consumer economy, and an inefficient collectivized agricultural system and industrial sector. Many of these same weaknesses continue to hold Russia back from developing into an advanced industrial democracy. Russia's current social, health, demographic, and economic indicators show a country in what could be permanent and irreversible decline, as documented in Nick Eberstadt's essay. Russia is neither a western nor even a middle-income country, but a fragile state that has more in com-mon with the poorest developing countries than middle income countries. These weaknesses suggest Russia is a declining power, and certainly not a rising power such as China.
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Paul Collier argues in his book, The Bottom Billion, that abundant natural resources can be a curse more than a blessing in a country with fragile institutions. In such a country, these resources will corrupt and undermine the legitimacy of the state and hamper the development of accountable institutions. The evidence suggests Russia is a poster-child for Collier's "resource curse" and thus its resources are a source of weakness, but, they are also simultaneously a source of strength because they allow Putin to do things he could not otherwise do. Some of this wealth has been squandered on mismanaged show and tell projects such as the $51 billion spent to prepare for the Sochi Olympics.
12 And a portion of the oil and gas infrastructure revenues have been siphoned off to enrich Putin's inner circle of former KGB agents who now control perhaps a third of the oil and gas wealth of the country. 13 Some of this oil and gas wealth, which makes up about 50% of the Russian government's revenues (another 15% is generated by mineral revenues), has been used by Putin to ensure pension and paychecks have been paid on time after the chaos of the 1990's. However, those pensions are now in danger as oil revenues can no longer support their current benefit levels. That oil and gas wealth also provides Russians with stable government jobs in exchange for the public's tacit acceptance of Putin's growing centralized, autocratic power, but they do little to transform Russia into an advanced economy.
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Russia's militaRy and cyBeR waRFaRe Build uP
One of the few elements of Russian national power now on the ascendency is its military. Putin had been rearming Russia at a rapid rate until 2017 when revenues could not support the increases. The Duma recommended a 27% cut in military spending for 2017 because of the depressed oil prices, while Jane's reported a 25% cut. In fact, the reduction in the Defense Ministry operational budget was about 7% according to an analysis in the National Interest. 15 This analysis argues that the Russia military industrial corporations were heavily indebted and the Defense Ministry decided to relieve this debt on a one-time basis, which made the defense cuts larger than they actually were. Putin has invested in the modernization of Russia's nuclear arsenal and the development of new and more advanced conventional weapons, even as Russia faces a depressing demographic future with high rates of drug addiction and alcoholism among young men. 16 Perhaps the greatest risk to Putin's strategic buildup may be this dependence on oil, gas, and mineral revenues. To minimize the effect of declining revenue on the defense buildup, Moscow has made a series of strategic decisions to choose guns over butter: cutting back public services such as education, health, and pensions. Disposable income for the average Russian family declined by 15% between 2014 and 2016, even as the military budget has been increasing. At the end of 2016, for the first time in seven years, Russian families were spending more than half their income on food and "the percentage of Russians who had any savings fell from 72% in 2013 to 29% in 2016," reported the Washington Post. 17 The rising Russian military threat was on display in Putin's invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, but he miscalculated in several critical respects. According to Moscow, a corrupt and illegitimate government had taken power through street demonstrations while Putin's democratically-elected ally in Kiev was driven from office by mob rule funded by billionaire George Soros and western civil society groups. Putin expected to be greeted by at least half of Ukraine as a Slavic liberating hero because eastern Ukraine has historically been more oriented towards Russia. Instead, Russia met Ukrainian resistance, and united what had been a divided country now mobilized to oppose the Russian invasion. 18 Multiple independent surveys of Ukrainian public opinion show at least 90% of the population opposes the Russian invasion and wants Russian troops to leave the country. The Russian military showed its strengths and weaknesses in the Ukrainian crisis. Its conventional weapons systems were substantially superior, eventually overwhelming the Ukrainian army, but its strategic planning was weak, its manpower pool for its army seriously constrained, and its command and control problematic.
19
Russia's new cyberwarfare capabilities were on display in 2016 in a highly visible way during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, the Dutch and French elections, and German parliament hacking incidents.
Perhaps the most authoritative public document describing Russian attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. elections may be found in the indictment submitted in federal court by U.S. Special Counsel Robert Mueller on February 16, 2018 against three Russian corporations and 13 individuals employed by or affiliated with those corporations. One of these Russian corporations, Internet Research Agency, owned by a close associate of Putin, Yevgeny Progozhin, sought to manipulate American voters by creating social media pages that made it appear to be controlled by U.S. political activists and focused on divisive political issues such as immigration, race, and religion. Starting in 2014, Internet Research Agency's employees created false personas on Facebook, Twitter and other platforms to post on these pages. The company also purchased advertisements online to direct individuals to these pages (funded through U.S. bank accounts and PayPal accounts established under stolen American identities), and posed as U.S. grassroots organizations to stage political rallies. Closer to the election, employees were instructed to post material to support Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders and to disparage Hillary Clinton, Marco Rubio, and Ted Cruz. Even after the election, the company coordinated rallies to protest the election results and stir up political discord. It was an effort to use America's open society, open information, and public discourse against itself, not simply to support one candidate over another but to disrupt American society and turn one group against another. One of the statutes which the Russian operatives were accused of violating was the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), a law enacted in 1938 to investigate Nazi propaganda efforts in the United States. The use of this anti-Nazi law to charge the Russians is one more indication of how much of a threat this is viewed by the U.S. justice system, and the state of Russian-American relations.
Leaving aside the question of whether President Donald Trump or his campaign managers collaborated, intentionally or not, with Putin's operatives, the indictments have placed a bright public spotlight on Russian espionage activities in the United States. During the Cold War, the KGB undertook similar activities as did other Great Powers, so espionage is not new nor particularly shocking. Adolph Hitler undertook similar espionage tactics in the United States in the 1930's, which is why the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act was passed in the first place. What is new is that it is happening now, at this moment and what the reaction has been in the United States and Europe. More than any other single effort since Vladimir Putin, his oligarchs and operatives took power, Russian election espionage to disrupt U.S. and European elections have convinced a rising body of public and elite opinion in the western democracies that Russia under Vladimir Putin and his oligarchs is an enemy, not simply a rival. Perception is often reality in politics. The first Trump Administration National Security Strategy released in December 2017 identified the two central geostrategic threats to the United States as China and Russia, not ISIS, not terrorism, not North Korea or Iran. This assertion was made in a document signed by Donald Trump, who wished months earlier for a very different relationship with Russia and Vladimir Putin. Putin's clumsy old-style KGB efforts to muck around in American politics has unintentionally ignited a new Cold War which the American and European publics, until this point, had not wanted to believe or had ignored. If that was Putin's goal, he was successful, but it is very unlikely he intended this at all because it now means western governments will marshal their very considerable instruments of national power and focus them on Russia which Putin can ill afford given the fragility of the country.
Some media reports stated that Putin blamed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the street demonstrations against the 2012 rigged election, that he apparently believed she organized through Russian civil society organizations. Putin, perhaps anticipating public hostility to the election corruption, expelled the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Moscow months before the 2012 elections. He correctly believed USAID was responsible for helping build Russian civil society over the previous two decades. It had been funding U.S. democracy NGOs such as the International Republican Institute and the Democratic National Institute to help strengthen Russian political parties and election processes for the 2012 elections. USAID has done this openly and consistently in countries around the world since these democracy programs were created in the 1980's and is not directed for or against any particular parties or candidates. While it was certainly the case that USAID, along with European aid agencies, helped support a nascent civil society in the post-Soviet years (something most western aid agencies do across the globe), there is no evidence of any conspiracy in the U.S. government to mobilize these groups to protest. Later, Russian cyber-warfare agencies hacked into the Democratic National Committee email system and accessed Clinton campaign advisor John Podesta's emails. Several weeks before leaving office, President Obama retaliated against the Russian hacking by imposing limited sanctions on Russia and expelling a few diplomats. He was six months late in imposing these sanctions as the Washington Post has documented. The Post reported the CIA presented President Obama a detailed account in June 2016 of how the Russian government intended to interfere in the U.S. election, but the President, took no serious actions to stop Russia until late October, and then modestly.
the ideOlOgy and mythOlOgy OF the Putin state
Putin has positioned himself and Russia as a culturally and religiously conservative alternative to western secular liberal democracies. This world view is described in Project Russia, which is a curious, if alarming, collection of essays published in five-volumes as a semi-official government publication that describes the political ideology of the State, the Orthodox Church's religious vision, geographic determinism, and social analysis shared by Putin and his circle of oligarchs who rule Russia. These essays form a strange amalgam of anti-democratic, reactionary, ultra-nationalist attacks on western democratic values, combined with an unhealthy dose of conspiracy theories, paranoia, xenophobia, and a defense of autocratic government and dictatorship. 20 One view of Project Russia is that its publication simply reflects Putin's understanding as a former KGB agent that a great power must have an ideology to defeat and undermine its rivals in propaganda battles. But a more sinister and alarming view is that the five volumes are Putin's blue print for Russia's grand strategy, evidence of a revisionist power seeking to overthrow the existing international order. If this interpretation of Project Russia is correct, it suggests a greater level of future conflict with the western democracies and international institutions. If Project Russia is a blue print and not just a propaganda tool, the risk of an accidental global conflagration between Russia and the NATO alliance is a serious potential scenario.
Vladimir Putin must find ways of explaining to the Russian people why the country is so far behind the western democracies, as did his predecessors in the Soviet Union. Putin continues to pursue the Soviet strategy of keeping the memory of World War II alive to stir up Russian nationalism among the population, but also as an explanation for Russia's underdevelopment. The evidence suggests that this strategy faces increasing hurdles. The Soviet Union's epic and extraordinary sacrifices during World War II -approximately 11 million soldiers and 9 million of their civilians having died -no longer have much resonance with the younger generation, who know little about the war, and the older generation, who tire of a war 70 years ago being used to explain Russian inability to match Western living standards today. Thus, what had been a powerful historical experience of collective suffering and sacrifice during World War II, has now become a fading memory which lacks the magnetic power it held over the Russian people during the Cold War. 21 Undoubtedly, one of the motivations behind Putin's attempt to regain Russia's lost stature in the world, expand its sphere of influence, attack western democratic institutions, and annex the territory of its neighbors is driven by a need to avenge the supposed "secret conspiracy" among the Western democracies to collapse, destroy, and humiliate Russia. 22 The Russian electronic media and Project Russia continue to propagate this view. The Russian government's arming of the Taliban, reported by U.S. intelligence sources and by CNN, may be a response to U.S. military intervention in Syria against the Assad Government, an ally of Russia, but it could also be payback for the CIA's arming of the Mujahedeen fighting The Cold War certainly involved the arming of U.S. and Russian client states against each other, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. policy changed to one of facilitating the integration of Russia into the international system and its conversion into a democratic capitalist system. Both the U.S. and Europe spent billions of aid dollars in programs in Russia from 1991 to 2012 to support these political and economic reforms. If they intended to destroy Russia permanently, why would they have made these large investments? It is also the case that President George H.W. Bush went to great lengths to avoid dancing on the grave of the Soviet empire as it collapsed to avoid giving fodder to Mikhail Gorbachev's critics.
Putin the Risk-takeR: gamBling as PuBlic POlicy
Putin's own popularity within Russia itself is both a sign of strength and weakness. After the invasion of Ukraine, Putin basked in record high poll ratings with over 90% public approval. As of the end of 2016, his ratings continued to be in the 80% range, an extraordinarily high figure, but only 53% of the Russian people believe the country was headed in the right direction. 24 When asked in earlier polls whether they would support Putin's foreign policies if Russian soldiers were killed in wars to accomplish these goals, his support dropped dramatically. This may be one reason the Russian government has made it illegal to publish or discuss combat casualty rates of the Ukraine conflict in public. Any public attention to the burial of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine or Syria has been aggressively suppressed.
Russia's entrance into the Syrian civil war on the side of its long-time ally, the Bashar al-Assad government, may have also been a serious strategic miscalculation if casualties continue to rise. The Russian intervention has been acting in concert with Iraq's Shia-dominated government and the Iranian government, which are enemies of ISIS. When a Russian jetliner in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula crashed on October 31, 2015, killing 224 Russian tourists who were leaving the resort at Sharm el-Sheikh, ISIS took credit for the plane crash. The U.S. and U.K. governments announced they believed ISIS was responsible for the incident. On November 6, 2015, Moscow banned all flights to the Sinai, when only days before it had criticized the U.K. and U.S. for doing so. Because the crash has been broadcast all over the Russian media, the public knows of the casualties. Then, on November 24, the Turkish military shot down a Russian fighter jet which Ankara claim violated Turkish air space causing a major diplomatic confrontation between the two countries. Putin imposed sanctions on Turkey, though they later repaired relations. When a Russian military helicopter flew in to rescue the downed pilot, Syrian rebels shot it down. On December 19, 2016, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey was assassinated at an art exhibit. ISIS claimed credit and explained it was in retaliation for the destruction of Aleppo. Anti-Russian demonstrations are growing across the Middle East because of Putin's military support for Bashir Assad's Syrian government and its atrocities against civilian populations. Putin's risk-taking is having consequences which he may not have anticipated.
destaBilizing Russia's neighBORs
General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, in testimony before a United States Senate Committee in March 2016, said, "Together, Russia and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve." Breedlove said that he could see no purpose behind the Russian bombing of purely civilian targets in Syria. He argued these bombing attacks were a tactic to increase refugee flows to Europe to destabilize the European political system and strengthen extremist political movements on the continent, many of which are pro-Putin. We have at least two additional pieces of evidence to suggest the Russians are weaponizing refugees. In 2015 and 2016, Russia appears to have facilitated the movement of Syrian and Iraqi refugees to the borders of Finland, and later Norway, and pushed them across the border. One of the major forces driving European voters to embrace far right wing and neo-Nazi fringe parties have been the two million refugees and migrants which have arrived in European countries and subsequent violent terrorist incidents or attacks against women which are being blamed on these migrants. 25 King Abdullah of Jordan told a group of U.S. Senators that President Erdogan of Turkey has been integrating ISIS extremists into the refugees moving into Europe from Turkey. This suggests Russia is not alone in using the refugee crisis to destabilize Europe.
Putin showed his diplomatic skills in turning the European migration crisis and terrorist attacks to Russia's advantage. 26 Putin may be creating, or at least contributing to, the very crisis to which he is trying to organize a European response. 27 The massacres in Paris on November 14, 2015, for which ISIS claimed credit, gave Putin a platform to express Russian solidarity with western democracies now under attack from Islamist extremists. Some European political leaders temporarily suspended their hostility to Russia over its aggression in Ukraine, and called for an alliance to defeat ISIS. The same argument was made by President Trump during the Presidential campaign. The refugee crisis and Paris massacres demonstrated to European publics their own vulnerability, and have already resulted in electoral gains for far-right wing parties in European elections. Many of these parties are vocal supporters of Putin and have received campaign funds from Moscow-such as Marine Le Pen in France-indirectly through a Russian bank in Cyprus (reportedly a front for the Russian intelligence service). 28 These parties are also antiEuropean Union, anti-American, and anti-NATO.
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Despite the profound weaknesses of Putin's Russia described in these essays, evolving circumstances have given Moscow reason to be optimistic in the short term that its grand strategy is succeeding. Some Western European democracies are moving to the extremes as populist movements which are overtly pro-Putin grow more influential or even win elections. As of 2017, pro-Russian governments have now been elected in Moldova, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Estonia.
u.s. POlicy tOwaRds Russia in the age OF dOnald tRumP
The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States on November 8, 2016, sent shock waves throughout the U.S. alliance system around the world because of his dissent from the bi-partisan support for this alliance system as the foundation of American national security. During the campaign, President Trump called for a reformulation of the U.S. commitment to defend NATO members based on whether they themselves have increased defense spending. He argued NATO should not focus on mutual defense against the Russian threat, but on counter-terrorism and efforts to crush ISIS. Much was made during the Presidential campaign of Donald Trump's admiration for Vladimir Putin and his intention to improve relations with Russia. The Washington Post published an indepth investigation into President Trump's business dealing with the Kremlin in the early stages of his Presidential campaign in August 2017, and found that his favorable comments about Putin took place just after negotiations on a Trump real estate deal in Moscow fell through.
By the summer of 2017, President Trump appeared to abandon efforts to cultivate Putin as he signed, under considerable pressure, bi-partisan legislation overwhelmingly approved by Congress to extend sanctions against Russia. Early in the Obama Administration, Secretary Clinton announced, somewhat theatrically, the famous "reset" in relations with Russia. Later, President Obama himself promised Russian President Medvedev that after the 2012 election he would transform U.S. policy towards Russia to be more accommodating of its interests and less critical of Russian foreign policy. Both Secretary Clinton and President Obama were later to regret their naiveté.
In Putin's call to Donald Trump after his victory in the Presidential election, he said U.S.-Russian relations should be based on "equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs." It is difficult to imagine in what way Russia should be treated as an equal to the United States. Its economy is less than 7% of the United States and is dependent on extractive wealth rather than technological innovation or dynamism, its military is a shadow (though a rising one) of what it was during the Cold War, its demographic indicators evidence of a declining power, and its institutions corrupted, fragile and dysfunctional. Putin does not actually mean non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. He means non-interference by the West in Russia's absorption of its neighbor's territories. No interference in Russia's disinformation campaigns against Western institutions. No consequences to Russian cyber-attacks against American and other Western democracies. And no interference in Russia's funding of extreme right and left wing parties in Europe which are hostile to NATO, the European Union, and the United States. Putin has also made clear that the Trump Administration's plan to modernize the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to the strategic balance of power with Russia, a view which is not shared by President Trump or Secretary of Defense James Mattis.
Even Donald Trump's attempts at improving relations between Russia and the United States was bogged down in media exposes, congressional hearings, and a special prosecutor investigating whether his campaign cooperated with the Russian government during the Presidential campaign. While the interference in the U.S. elections may have made Putin look stronger than he actually is, it has also increased U.S. opposition, particularly among Democrats, to Putin and the threat Russia poses under his leadership. The Republican congressional leadership has been virtually unanimous in opposing President Trump's attempt to cultivate Vladimir Putin. Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, even called the Putin government "gangsters". President Trump has made confusing public statements about the U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance. When President Trump spoke at the NATO meeting in early 2017, he altered his prepared text and pointedly refused to affirm Article 5, the mutual defense guarantee which is the strategic foundation for the Western Alliance. A short time later in Poland, in a major speech he affirmed the U.S. commitment to the NATO alliance and Article 5 in very clear terms. This confusion in the American Position alarmed European political leaders and diplomats.
thReats tO Putin's Rule
After the Russian economy began to unravel in mid-2014, Putin repeatedly purged KGB generals to eliminate any potential rivals or risk of a coup. On November 14, 2016, the Minister of Economic Development, Alexei Ulyukaev, who was one of the last remaining reform-minded technocrats in Putin's cabinet and a potential rival, was arrested on contrived charges. 30 While to the outside world Vladimir Putin may appear to be a towering figure of autocratic and decisive strength amidst a field of weak, diminished, and distracted Western democratic leaders, in reality, his rule is tenuous, his power base unstable, and Mother Russia more fragile than it appears. A collapse of Russia would be a disaster because of the chaos it would cause, the terrible humanitarian consequences for the Russian people, the risk of its nuclear arsenal getting into the wrong hands, and certainly not in the interests of a stable world order, but it could happen. Alternately, Putin's own individual reign could end as quickly and as unexpectedly as it began, but without the collapse of Russia itself. It could be a popular uprising over declining living standards and disgust over endemic corruption, or it could be a coup d'état by KGB generals Putin did not purge fast enough. The nascent institutions Putin has weakened under his tenure may be unable to stabilize the country in the event of such an internal crisis. Because there are no permanent governing institutions or norms, few know who Putin's successor would be. Russia could once again surprise the outside world.
The evidence presented in these essays suggests Russia is an increasingly well-armed, declining power, but also a revisionist one which seeks to undermine or destroy the existing international order. A declining, revisionist power can be as dangerous and destabilizing as a rising power, particularly if it has a large land army, cyber warfare capability, new advanced conventional weapons, and a nuclear arsenal. For several years now, the Kremlin has boasted publicly that it can incinerate western European countries with its nuclear arsenal, rhetoric which sounds more inflammatory than during the Cold War. Despite Putin's short-term tactical victories against a weakened and distracted Western alliance, the long-term prospects are not good for Russia, given its internal fragility. Its public services, military power, and economic system rest on an unstable foundation of volatile oil, gas, and mineral revenues, a propaganda machine that grossly distorts external reality for the Russian people, a demographic time-bomb, corrupted institutions which lack legitimacy and resilience, and a corrupt governing elite of Oligarchs who make up Putin's inner circle.
Thus, in response to the question posed by these essays-Is Russia a Fragile State or a 21 st century Revisionist Power?-the answer is, it is both. The problem for Vladimir Putin is that the gap between his grand strategy and Russia's capabilities and internal fragility is so great that he will eventually fail, and fail dramatically, but as Nicholas Eberstadt writes, a great many very unpleasant things can happen before this gap leads to Russia's failure. 31 NOTES
